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BANKRUPTCY IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: 1996
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFF*

INTRODUC7ION

At least with regard to decisions involving bankruptcy issues, 1996' was a
very uneventful year in the Seventh Circuit. Most opinions dealt with routine
matters.' Therefore, this short survey discusses only five decisions.

I. THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The case, In re Carousel InternationalCorp.,3 involved the unsuccessful
attempt of a nondebtor to invoke the protection of the automatic stay. The asset
involved was $250,000 held by an escrow agent pending resolution of a
controversy between Carousel (the debtor) and Carousel's shareholders. Creditors
of the shareholders (not creditors of the debtor) obtained liens against the
escrowed funds prior to the resolution of the controversy. Other creditors of the
shareholders argued that these liens were void because they were obtained prior
to the resolution of the debtor's claim to the escrowed funds, during a period when
the automatic stay was in effect. The court rejected this argument. It reasoned that
funds not belonging to the debtor were not part of the estate and thus not protected
by the automatic stay.4
This is the correct result. However, there are other, and sounder, lines of
reasoning which lead to the same result. The court could have decided that
nondebtor co-owners of the escrowed funds had no standing to assert a violation
of the automatic stay.5 Such a rationale would have eliminated the need to
conclude that the stay does not protect nonownership claims to property, an
arguably incorrect conclusion in certain circumstances.6 Because the dispute
involved only nondebtors, the court could also have decided that the bankruptcy
court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate this controversy. Such a holding would
have been consistent with the Seventh Circuit's narrow view of the bankruptcy
court's "related to" jurisdiction.7

* Robert H. McKinney Emeritus Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington.
1. This survey covers cases decided between November 1, 1995, and October 31, 1996.
2. In re Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, Inc., 72 F.3d 1305 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 389 (1996), involves cram-down of a plan for a not-for-profit entity, hardly a routine matter.
In fact, it is so unusual that it is of more academic than practical interest.
3. 89 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 1996).
4.

Id. at 362.

5. See Winters v. George Mason Bank, 94 F.3d 130, 135 (4th Cir. 1996).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1994) prohibits "any act to obtain possession property of the
estate or of property from the estate..." (emphasis added). This language covers situations in
which the debtor has only a possessory interest in an asset. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
362.03[5] at 362-19 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 1997).
7. See In re Fedpak Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 207,213-215(7th Cir. 1996).
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II. POWERS OF AVOIDANCE

Section 547(c)' protects certain preferential transfers from avoidance. Section
547(c)(2) is one of the most important protection provisions. It prevents
avoidance when the alleged preferential transfer both is subjectively and
objectively "ordinary." The past practices of both the parties (the subjective
element) and the industry (the objective element) must be considered when
making this determination. In the case, In re Tolona Pizza,9 decided by the
Seventh Circuit several years ago, the court accepted a moderately relaxed
standard of proof for establishing the industry practice. The party defending the
transaction does not need to establish the precise contours of industry norms.
Rather, it must only show that a challenged payment was "within the outer limits
of normal industry practices."'"
In re Midway Airlines, Inc." demonstrates that Tolona Pizza did not eliminate
the need to present evidence of objective industry practice. In Midway the
creditor-transferee offered evidence of its relationship with Midway and other
members of the industry to establish the objective, industry-wide standard of
practice. The court decided that this was not sufficient. Even though the exact
parameters of the industry practice need not be established, the transferee must
provide "proof
beyond solely what is normal between the debtor and the
12
creditor."'

H. DISCHARGE POLICY
When first adopted, the current bankruptcy code made it very difficult for
debtors to enter into enforceable reaffirmation agreements. Court approval was
always required, and the standards for approval were very demanding. The
situation changed in 1984 when statutory control over the reaffirmation process
was relaxed. 3 There is some evidence that the loosening of control occurred, in
part at least, because Congress believed that § 362(a)(6) 14 prohibits any creditor
initiated discussions of reaffirmation.
The committee believes that the automatic stay provided under
section 362 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 has drastically
reduced, if not eliminated, the abusive practices encountered under the
pre-1978 bankruptcy law. Creditors can no longer independently contact
debtors to encourage them to reaffirm debts because such contact is

8.

11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1994).

9. 3 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1993). See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Bankruptcy in the Seventh
Circuit: 1993, 27 IND. L. REV. 761,762-63 (1994).
10. Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1033.
11. 69 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 1995).

12.

Id. at 798

13.

See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS

323-24 (3d ed. 1996).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1994).
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prohibited by the code.
The proposals before the committee to remedy defects in the
reaffirmation process would not alter the prohibitions on contact with the
debtor. Therefore, the major protection provided under the code to
prevent coercive reaffirmation remains intact. Reaffirmations obtained
presently that are subsequently denied by a bankruptcy court are, in fact,
truly voluntary reaffirmations."5
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit in the case, In re Duke 6 recently endorsed
the view that a creditor's noncoercive request for a reaffirmation does not violate
§ 362(a)(6). 7 According to Judge Wood, "[t]here is no reason to believe that
reaffirmation agreements inevitably disadvantage debtors, and thus that the
automatic stay should be used to protect debtors against this type of creditor effort
to collect a pre-petition debt."' 8
Not all would agree that reaffirmation requests are so benign.' 9 Nevertheless,
we are in a period when creditor interests are more highly valued than debtor
concerns. A retrenchment in many respects of debtor bankruptcy protection began
shortly after the new code became effective and continues today. The Duke
decision, although not admirable, is consistent with the spirit of the times.2' To
preserve a modicum of debtor protection, the validation of creditor-initiated
reaffirmations should be limited to situations like the one in Duke where (1) the
debtor is represented by counsel and (2) counsel is informed of the reaffirmation
request. Communications directed only to the debtor2' or involving pressure
tactics22 should still be found to violate § 362(a)(6).
IV. PROCEDURE
The legislation which introduced changes in reaffirmation practice also created
a new structure and operating procedure for the post-Marathoncourt system.23
Section 157(a)24 permits the district court to refer bankruptcy litigation to
bankruptcy judges. Section 157(d) then requires withdrawal of proceedings from

15. S. Rep. No. 98-65, at 10, 11 (1983).
16. 79 F.3d 43 (7th Cir. 1996).
17. Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union, 851 F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1988).
18. Duke, 79 F.3d at 45.
19. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Fresh Start, False Start, or Head Start?, 70 IND. L.J. 549,
557-59 (1995); HENRY SOMMER & GARY KLEIN, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACrICE §
8.8.1, at 149-50 (5th ed. 1996).
20. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Debtor Protectionat the Close of the Twentieth Century, 23
CAP. U. L. REV. 379, 393 (1994).
21. See In re Flynn, 143 B.R. 798, 802-03 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).
22. In re Walker, 194 B.R. 165, 169 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996).
23. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. MarathonPipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) had
decided that the then existing bankruptcy court system was unconstitutional.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 157(a)(1994).
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the bankruptcy judge when resolution of the dispute "requires consideration of
both title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or
activities affecting interstate commerce."' The rationale for this rule "can only
'
be the subject of conjecture."26
Sensing the possibility that withdrawal motions may be employed to stall
litigation, courts have narrowly construed § 157(d). In re Vicars Insurance
Agency, Inc.,27 the first opinion on withdrawal standards in this circuit, holds that
"mandatory withdrawal is required only [w]hen [the] . . . issues require
interpretation, as opposed to mere application, of the non-title 11 statute, or when
the court must undertake analysis of significant open and unresolved issues
regarding the non-title 11 law. 28
In Vicars, the non-title 11 law was RICO. Even though the court of appeals
had not yet spoken on the issue presented, the court felt that there was enough
guidance available in district court opinions. Therefore, withdrawal was not
required.
V. CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY

Must cross-border insolvency disputes arise in the Southern District of New
York. That fact alone should create interest in such litigation when it occurs in the
Northern District of Indiana. Although In re Rimsat, Ltd.29 will probably not
receive much critical attention because it presents fairly mundane issues, readers
of this survey will surely be interested in Judge Posner's description of the debtor.
Rimsat had been formed in 1992 to provide satellite communications
(using Russian equipment) to Tonga and other islands in the South
Pacific. Most of its investors are Malaysian. It was incorporated in the
Federation of St. Christopher and Nevis (also known as the Federation of
Saint Kitts and Nevis), a Caribbean nation that belongs to the British
Commonwealth.... Its principal place of business is in Fort Wayne,
Indiana. Most of its financial assets are there, but its nonfinancial assets,
principally leaseholds in satellites, have no terrestrial site.3"
Would a law professor dare to put such an implausible fact situation on a final
exam?

25.
26.
27.

28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1994).
1 CoLIER, supra note 6,13.01 [e][iii], at 3-69.
96 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 1996).

28.

Id.at 954.

29.
30.

98 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 957.

